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TILTING THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD: 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MEETS 
LEGAL THEORY 
Sheila Suess Kennedy* 
INTRODUCTION 
There is an old story about two businessmen who take a 
quarrel to the village Rabbi. He listens to the first man tell his 
side, and says, “Yes, you are right.” The second man then gives 
his version of the affair, and once again the Rabbi says, “You are 
right.” At that point, an onlooker protests, “They can’t both be 
right!” To this the Rabbi responds, “Ah, yes, you also are 
right.” American public administrators increasingly find 
themselves in the position of that Rabbi, needing to acknowledge 
the legitimacy of competing claims on the government that are 
seemingly both correct and but are mutually exclusive. Wanting 
to be fair, we are torn between programs intended to ameliorate 
past injustices and complaints that the programs themselves are 
unjust. 
The idea of equality is a bedrock element of the American 
legal and political systems; we strive for a meritocracy and 
affirm the government’s obligation to treat similarly situated 
citizens equally. The ‘level playing field’ is a favorite metaphor 
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for politicians and public administrators alike. Whether a playing 
field is truly level, however, is often a contentious issue. This 
article analyzes the constitutional requirements of equal treatment 
against claims arising in the context of affirmative action and 
charitable choice, programs whose proponents claim that the field 
must “tilt” if genuine equality is to be achieved. But, if 
government must treat people differently—that is, unequally—to 
achieve real equality, what are the implications for public policy, 
public management and the rule of law? Indeed, how are we to 
define equality so that, to appropriate Justice Stewart’s famous 
approach to obscenity, I will “know it when I see it”?1 
I. JUSTICE, FAIRNESS & DIFFERENCE 
The notion of the level playing field has been invoked 
politically as a necessary condition of democracy, a convenient 
metaphor for saying that a democracy, defined anywhere along 
the spectrum, presupposes the absence of a wide disparity in the 
participatory capabilities of the citizenry.2 Political equality has 
been deemed present when “the decision rule for determining 
outcomes at the decisive stage must take into account, and take 
equally into account, the expressed preferences of each member 
of the demos as to the outcome.”3 This construct, of course, begs 
                                                          
1 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(discussing the difficulty in defining obscenity). 
2 See, e.g., Michael J. Goldberg, Derailing Union Democracy: Why 
Deregulation Would Be a Mistake, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 137 
(2002) (discussing the importance of a level playing field as a basic safeguard 
of democracy). 
3 Robert A. Dahl, Procedural Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND 
SOCIETY 97 (Peter Laslett & James Fishkin eds., 1979) (examining the idea of 
procedural democracy and the problem of inclusion, and examining various 
solutions to the problem of inclusion, including his own). Procedural 
democracy is the idea that certain criteria should govern the decision-making 
process of any human association. Id. at 101. Such criteria include political 
equality (decisions must take into account the preferences of each member 
equally), effective participation (members must have adequate and equal 
opportunity to express individual preferences) and enlightened understanding 
(members must have adequate and equal opportunity to discover and evaluate 
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the question of equal access to membership, among other things. 
Philosophers have gone beyond such narrow rules of political 
participation in describing the role of equality in a just society. 
Aristotle defined as a fundamental attribute of justice the 
principle that equals should be treated equally, begging the 
questions “who are equals?” and “what constitutes equal 
treatment?” John Rawls proposes that we construct our legal and 
political system behind a veil of ignorance: if we do not know 
beforehand what our personal attributes or social station will be, 
the theory goes, we will be more likely to construct a system that 
is fair to all, even where it may be unequal.4 Amartya Sen argues 
that, no matter how many rights individuals may have, if material 
conditions are such that those individuals cannot freely choose 
their ends—if they are so afflicted by disease or constrained by 
custom or poverty that they are not truly free to choose their own 
goals—they are neither free nor equal.5 
Virtually all political philosophies exalt equality as an ideal, 
but as Ian Hacking wryly noted, there is a wide variety of 
                                                          
individual preferences). Id. at 101-05. The problem of inclusion relates to the 
membership of the association, i.e., who has a right to be included in the 
association and who can properly be excluded. Id. at 109. 
4 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 3 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 223, 235 (1985). Specifically, Rawls argues: 
We must find some point of view, removed from and not distorted by 
the particular features and circumstances of the all-encompassing 
background framework, from which a fair agreement between free 
and equal persons can be reached. The original position, with the 
feature I have called ‘the veil of ignorance,’ is this point of view. 
And the reason why the original position must abstract from and not 
be affected by the contingencies of the social world is that the 
conditions for a fair agreement on the principals of political justice 
between free and equal persons must eliminate the bargaining 
advantages which inevitably arise within the background institutions 
of any society as the result of cumulative social, historical and natural 
tendencies. 
Id. 
5 AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 66-69, 102-107 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1992). See also Ian Hacking, In Pursuit of Happiness, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Sept. 19, 1996, at 40 (reviewing AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY 
REEXAMINED (1992)). 
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working definitions of the term.6 Libertarians want equality of 
rights, or equality before the law. Egalitarians want equality of 
results in varying formulations.7 Free market advocates want 
equal access to markets.8 Americans speak often of “equality of 
opportunity” a term often defined as the opportunity to compete 
on . . . what else? A level playing field. And so we come full 
circle, having consistently avoided the crucial question, “equality 
of what?” 
Unless we are able to define the “what,” we will be similarly 
unable to decide what sorts of differences require recognition if 
genuine equality is to be achieved. Even if we are talking simply 
about equal rights before the law, using the narrowest possible 
construction of that term, a fair and equal system must take note 
of and allow for differences between children and adults, 
competent and incompetent persons, motorists and pedestrians, 
and so forth. All but the most doctrinaire egalitarians will allow 
for differences in need resulting from a variety of factors, 
including behavior and effort. As Will Kymlicka noted, in other 
countries it is “increasingly accepted that some forms of cultural 
difference can only be accommodated through special legal or 
constitutional measures, above and beyond the common rights of 
                                                          
6 Hacking, supra note 5, at 41-42 (noting the different theories of equality 
and discussing how Sen’s focus on “equality of what” deviates from the 
previous focus on “equality for whom”). 
7  Many years ago I read a wonderful science fiction story, the name of 
which I have unfortunately long forgotten, describing a society so obsessed 
with the egalitarian version of equality that persons who could run fast were 
weighted down with sandbags; those with high I.Q.s required to wear 
earphones playing distracting music, and so forth. For further discussion of 
egalitarian theories, see MICHAEL QUINN, JUSTICE AND EGALITARIANISM vi, 
41 (1991) (stating that at the core of egalitarian theories of justice is the notion 
that society should ensure that individuals have the same ability to make 
reasoned choices, thus allowing for each person to equally consider his or her 
choices in life). However, Quinn notes that theorists, including Rawls, 
Dworkin and Nozick, differ in how this ideal should be accomplished and 
what stands in the way of accomplishing it. Id. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999). 
8 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
(1997). 
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citizenship.”9 These systems recognize that applying the same 
rules to everyone does not necessarily treat everyone as equal. 
Further complicating the issue of difference, and the 
importance we should assign to it in an effort to define equality, 
is the significance of labels or framing. In the introduction to 
Making All the Difference Martha Minow tells the story of animal 
behaviorist Harold Herzog, Jr., who works in a laboratory at the 
University of Tennessee and must obtain approval for any 
experiment on the 15,000 or so mice they use each year.10 Yet 
the concern over mouse welfare does not extend to those that 
escape and are subsequently labeled “pests,” nor to field mice 
that might get into the building.11 Those mice are routinely 
captured and destroyed.12 Similarly, other mice are used as food 
for other experimental animals, and likewise fall outside the rules 
governing appropriate treatment.13 Finally, and ironically, when a 
pet mouse owned by Herzog’s son died the family gave “Willie” 
a funeral, complete with a tombstone.14 The moral of the story, 
as both Herzog and Minow note, is that our sense of equitable 
behavior depends heavily upon the labels we assign and the 
language with which we describe the situation and categories 
before us.15 Anyone doubting the accuracy of this observation, or 
                                                          
9 WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY 
OF MINORITY RIGHTS 26 (1995) (noting that group-specific rights may better 
serve to accommodate cultural differences in some societies than universal 
individual rights). 
10 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, 
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 4-5 (1990) (noting that in addition to the 
approval needed for any experiment using the mice, the United States 
Department of Agriculture and the American Association for the Accreditation 
of Laboratory Animal Care maintain control over the standard of care 
provided to the experimental mice through inspection and monitoring). 
11 Id. at 5. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. As the Herzog family mourned Willie’s demise, they were setting 
up traps each night in an effort to eliminate the mice that infested their 
kitchen. Id. 
15 Id. Minow and Herzog conclude that the negative labels humans use to 
refer to animals dictate the way such animals are treated by humans. Id. In a 
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its relevance to issues of equality, need only look to 
contemporary political disputes over gay rights or reproductive 
choice. When the gay community demands equality, the Christian 
Right responds that what they really want is “special rights.” 
When some women talk about “the right to choose” as an 
element of religious equality, others respond by equating choice 
with murder and by labeling pro-choice advocates “baby killers.” 
Americans believe in equality; we don’t believe in “special 
rights.” We believe in personal autonomy and respect for 
different religious beliefs; we don’t condone baby-killing. He 
who frames the issue wins the debate. Unfortunately, the 
competition to be the first to label—to be the side that 
successfully frames the issue—usually generates more heat than 
light. 
II. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUALITY 
In the United States discussions of equality generally, 
although certainly not always, begin with examining the role of 
government and the meaning and application of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, passage of 
which, as Akhil Reed Amar has persuasively argued, profoundly 
changed the way in which America defines its constitutional 
principles, including principles of equality.16 
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying 
persons within their respective jurisdictions “the equal protection 
of the laws.”17 The pertinent language reads: 
                                                          
similar way, the labels often assigned to certain groups of people usually bear 
a direct relation to the moral judgments made about those people. Id. 
16 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 7 (1998) (introducing his argument that the Fourteenth 
Amendment has, since its passage, greatly influenced the way in which the 
Bill of Rights is viewed). To the extent that people think that the Bill of Rights 
applies directly to state government action, people have come to ignore the 
Fourteenth Amendment itself. In reality, it underlies everyone’s thinking 
because the Fourteenth Amendment created the avenue for applying the Bill of 
Rights to the states in the first instance. Id. 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.18 
The language is straightforward and congressional debate 
surrounding passage, as well as subsequent arguments for and 
against ratification, proceeded on the assumption that the 
amendment would obligate the states to “incorporate” the Bill of 
Rights—that is, would impose upon the states the same 
limitations that the original Bill of Rights imposed upon the 
federal government.19 Nevertheless, the amendment, and 
particularly its Equal Protection Clause, were subsequently 
interpreted by the Supreme Court much more narrowly. The 
“fundamental rights” protected by the Bill of Rights were applied 
to the states very slowly, and over a period of many years.20 
                                                          
18 Id. 
19 See generally AMAR, supra note 16, at 163-74, 197-206 (discussing the 
politics of ratification and incorporation debate). 
20 For example, in 1833 the Supreme Court held that the rights 
guaranteed in the first eight amendments did not apply to state governments. 
See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 249 (1833) (finding that the Fifth, 
Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution applied only to 
the federal government and not to the states). Forty years later, in the now-
infamous Slaughter-House Cases, the Court held that those same eight 
amendments were not “privileges and immunities” of citizenship. See 83 U.S. 
36, 81 (1872) (noting, “we are of opinion that the rights claimed by these 
plaintiffs in error, if they have any existence, are not privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States within the meaning of the clause of 
the fourteenth amendment under consideration”). Subsequently, in a series of 
cases, the Court gradually read the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as “incorporating” fundamental liberties, making those guarantees 
that could be deemed fundamental binding on the States. For an overview of 
the evolution of the incorporation doctrine, see generally Twining v. New 
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (finding the exemption from self-incrimination 
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as not 
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Even after the Equal Protection Clause was so applied, early 
notions of equal protection accommodated treatment that was 
“separate but equal.” Not until Brown v. Board of Education in 
1954 did the Supreme Court conclude that separate was 
inherently unequal.21 
The equality protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
the equality proposed by political philosophers. Rather, the 
amendment is consistent with the founders’ belief that liberty is 
essentially defined in the negative, as freedom from state 
constraints on individuals’ beliefs and behaviors.22 Equality in 
                                                          
incorporated under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (holding that Fifth 
Amendment immunity from double jeopardy is not incorporated under the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947) 
(incorporating protection against compulsory self-incrimination by fear of 
hurt, torture or exhaustion under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (finding that the 
Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination is 
incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment); Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds that it represents a 
“fundamental ideal in constitutional heritage”). 
21 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the doctrine of “separate but 
equal” holds no place in the field of public education because “separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal”). See also Gaston County, N.C. 
v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (determining it appropriate to analyze 
whether a state or county has a history of separate and inferior educational 
opportunities, as outlined in Brown v. Board of Education, when deciding the 
fairness of a literacy test under the auspice of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
and upholding the lower court’s determination that because such a history was 
present in Gaston County the literacy test was unfair and barred by the Act). 
22 See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). In 
Allgeyer the Court declared that: 
 [t]he liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth Amendment] means not 
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint 
of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace 
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; 
to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he 
will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any 
livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter all contracts 
which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a 
KENNEDY MACROX.DOC 7/7/03 11:15 AM 
 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MEETS LEGAL THEORY 503 
that sense is limited to our right to be treated equally by 
government. Equal protection analysis thus begins with an 
inquiry as to whether there has been state action, without which 
there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 
Once it is determined that state action is present, courts apply 
an elaborate “tiered” analysis that hinges upon the nature of the 
classification involved and the precision with which the 
government action has been focused. As Randall Kelso 
explained: 
[t]he first inquiry is what governmental interests support a 
statute’s constitutionality. Depending upon the standard of 
review, the governmental interests must be legitimate or 
permissible; important, substantial, or significant; or 
compelling or overriding. Of course, the governmental 
interest may be impermissible or illegitimate, and thus not 
support the statute under any standard of review.24 
                                                          
successful conclusion of the purposes above mentioned. 
Id. See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 851 (1992). In 
Casey the Court explained: 
 [i]t is a promise of our Constitution that there is a realm of personal 
liberty which the government may not enter. . . . Our law affords 
constitutional protection to personal relations relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education. These matters, involving the most intimate and personal 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal 
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. 
23 This search is not as simple as it may seem. State action jurisprudence 
is virtually incoherent, with serious consequences beyond the scope of this 
article. See generally Sheila S. Kennedy, When is Private Public? State Action 
in the Era of Privatization and Private-Public Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON 
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 203 (2001) (emphasizing that under the state action 
doctrine, public invasions of rights are constitutionally prohibited, while the 
Fourteenth Amendment affords no protection against private conduct). 
24 R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection 
Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The 
“Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 225, 227 (2002). 
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Subsequent inquiries focus upon the methods employed to 
advance those governmental ends.25 Under the rational basis test, 
if the government’s interest is “legitimate” or “permissible,” the 
law must be rationally related to its objective.26 A second tier, 
commonly known as intermediate scrutiny, requires that where 
the interest is “important, substantial or significant” there must 
be a more substantial nexus, or connection, between the means 
and the end.27 If a given law targets a suspect class or impinges 
upon a fundamental interest, the governmental interest must be 
“compelling” and a direct relationship must be demonstrated in 
accordance to “strict scrutiny” standards.28 Where heightened 
scrutiny is applied, either intermediate or strict, a final level of 
analysis focuses upon whether the law in question has been 
narrowly tailored to achieve its ends—such that it avoids 
imposing a burden greater than necessary to the achievement of 
the desired ends.29 
Most challenges to equal protection are decided under the 
“rational basis” test and it is an unusual law that fails to pass 
muster under this standard, which is highly deferential to the 
state.30 However, certain classifications have been determined 
                                                          
25 See generally id. 
26 Id. at 227. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 228. 
29 Id. at 234. 
30 Id. at 230-32. One notable exception is Romer v. Evans, in which the 
Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado State Constitution, 
holding that animus toward a particular group of people—here, homosexuals—
could never constitute a legitimate state purpose. 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
The Court noted: 
[Colorado’s amendment] fails, indeed defies, even this conventional 
inquiry. First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a 
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an 
exceptional and . . . invalid form of legislation. Second, its sheer 
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the 
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the 
class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state 
interests. 
Id. 
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inherently suspect and require closer examination by the courts. 
Race, national origin and alienage will trigger strict scrutiny, as 
will laws burdening a fundamental right. The categories requiring 
strict scrutiny are those where members of the group share an 
immutable characteristic, have historically suffered pervasive 
discrimination, and where efforts to vindicate their rights in the 
political arena are unlikely to succeed. Categories that will be 
examined under “heightened,” but not strict, scrutiny include, for 
example, gender and legitimacy.31 
As the above, somewhat cursory, overview of equal 
protection analysis illustrates, the Supreme Court has fashioned a 
highly technical template to determine whether there has been a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is substantial 
scholarship suggesting that the Court has not hesitated to 
manipulate this template to serve political or ideological ends.32 It 
is certainly the case that equal protection jurisprudence has 
evolved without the benefit of any overarching, generally 
accepted theory of equality, negative or positive. It should not 
come as a surprise, therefore, that equal protection case law is 
anything but coherent, nor that political constituencies 
unschooled in the arcane language of legal analysis view much of 
it as unfair and decidedly unequal. Because the stability of a 
society depends in large measure upon the extent to which 
members of that society feel they are treated justly, this popular 
                                                          
31 See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 681 (13th ed. 1997) (stating that gender, alienage and illegitimacy have 
evoked “varying, and often unstable” degrees of heightened scrutiny). This 
remains true even in contemporary society, although the latter seems quaint in 
these days of celebrity unwed motherhood. When one considers that 
illegitimacy will trigger heightened scrutiny while the Court has thus far been 
unwilling to accord even quasi-suspect status to sexual orientation, it would 
seem past time to revisit the tiers of current equal protection jurisprudence. 
32 See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rhenquist Court, 4 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 350, 371 (2002) (arguing that the tiers of equal protection 
scrutiny are “a vessel into which the Justices pour their values”); R. Randall 
Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause, supra note 
24, at 226 (2002) (arguing that six or seven different levels of equal protection 
scrutiny are used, instead of the traditional three, to accommodate the Justices’ 
beliefs). 
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resentment is no small matter. If the rules promulgated by the 
state are believed by large segments of the citizenry to differ 
substantially from their internalized notions of fair play and equal 
treatment, the consequences for legal legitimacy and voluntary 
compliance can be quite negative. 
The disparity between popular understanding of equality and 
its legal or constitutional definition takes on added urgency as 
government becomes a more pervasive element of citizens’ 
everyday experiences. In a society where the operations of the 
state reach increasingly into areas that were previously entirely 
private, the ways that state conducts business, uses its power to 
shape law and provide for the common welfare become critical 
elements in the formation of that society, and the degree to which 
that society values or devalues particular notions of equality.33 
III. NEUTRALITY AND EQUALITY 
It is impossible to understand the political passions aroused 
by affirmative action, charitable choice, or any other government 
action that specifically recognizes difference in order to achieve 
equality, without first understanding the importance Americans 
attach to governmental neutrality. As I have written elsewhere, 
the one thing most Americans will agree upon, at least publicly, 
is that our goal is the establishment of a society in which skin 
                                                          
33 Not only do contemporary laws and regulations address numerous areas 
of American life that were hitherto unregulated, government programs such as 
social security and welfare, and government agencies like the Small Business 
Administration, the United States Civil Rights Commission, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, and many others, are part of the 
landscape of even the average citizen. See, e.g., D.J. GALLIGAN, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW xi (1992). Galligan posits that: 
 [t]he rise of the welfare state and the regulation of social and 
economic activity have meant a substantial expansion of government 
in the middle and later years of the twentieth century. New and wide 
ranging legislative programmes have been developed; a host of new 
authorities have been created, and the lives of citizens have been 
much controlled and regulated. 
Id. 
KENNEDY MACROX.DOC 7/7/03 11:15 AM 
 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MEETS LEGAL THEORY 507 
color, gender and the like are officially irrelevant.34 Most of us 
really do want a society where people are judged by their actions, 
talents and “the content of their characters,” where the same, 
neutral rules apply to everyone in equal measure.35  
If one believes that it is profoundly immoral to disadvantage 
someone on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation or other 
aspects of one’s fundamental identity, it seems morally and 
intellectually inconsistent to award advantage on that same basis. 
Furthermore, programs that single out particular groups for 
protection or other special treatment raise the specter of misuse 
of government power: how do we ensure that such programs are 
based upon a desire to remedy demonstrable inequalities and not 
on considerations of political or other advantage? If government 
can “bend the rules” for one group, what is to keep it from 
advantaging others who are less deserving? How shall we define 
desert for such purposes? 
Of course, legal discourse discussing neutrality runs into 
many of the same problems encountered in discussions of 
equality. If African-Americans have been enslaved, stigmatized 
and segregated over the past three hundred years, how “neutral” 
is a system that removes legal barriers but does nothing to 
remedy the personal and structural effects of those experiences? 
Because official neutrality, like equality, is highly valued but 
rarely defined, it is often argued that applying special rules to 
certain groups actually furthers more general neutrality.36 As 
                                                          
34 SHEILA KENNEDY, WHAT’S A NICE REPUBLICAN GIRL LIKE ME DOING 
AT THE ACLU? 182-91 (1997) (postulating in part that the approach of 
traditional Republicanism to questions of equality was similar to that of civil 
libertarians in that both were suspicious of government intrusions). 
35 Id. 
36 See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in 
Terms of Liberty, Equality and Free Speech Values: A Critical Analysis of 
“Neutrality Theory” and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 243 (1999). Brownstein criticizes neutrality theory on three bases. 
Id. at 246-47. First, he argues that neutrality theory is a misnomer because it 
encourages decisions that favor religious choices. Id. Second, by focusing 
solely on government interference with religion and liberty, it ignores other 
constitutional values affected by charitable choice laws. Id. at 247. Third, the 
theory ignores “the positive role that government should play in promoting 
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noted by Alan Brownstein, proponents of charitable choice use 
“neutrality theory” to justify a form of affirmative action for 
faith-based organizations.37 Brownstein stated: 
The goal of neutrality theory, according to Esbeck, is to 
‘maximize [ ] religious liberty.’ That objective is best 
accomplished by the minimization of the government’s 
influence over personal choices concerning religious 
beliefs and practices. The goal is realized when 
government is neutral as to the religious choices of its 
citizens. Thus, whether pondering the constitutionality of 
exemptions from regulatory burdens or as to equal 
treatment as to benefit programs, in both situations the 
integrating principle is neutralizing the impact of 
government action on personal religious choices. 38 
                                                          
religious liberty and equality.” Id. See also Susanna Dokupil, A Sunny Dome 
with Caves of Ice: The Illusion of Charitable Choice, 5 TEX. L. & REV. POL. 
149, 198 (2000) (suggesting that neutrality theory is biased in favoring some 
religious organizations over others because it will invariably result in greater 
benefits to larger religious institutions with more resources and political 
influence). 
37 Brownstein, supra note 36, at 246-56. Brownstein advocates a holistic 
approach to scrutiny of charitable choice proposals. Id. at 249. First, he 
acknowledges the basis for some preferential treatment of religious 
organizations as “constitutionally justified, if not required.” Id. Brownstein 
further recognizes that other decisions that may disadvantage religious 
organizations, such as access to state benefits, may be warranted as a result of 
that preferential treatment. Id. Brownstein notes that, “[i]f regulatory 
exemptions result in incentives favoring religion, the granting of exemptions 
creates an imbalance in the constitutional ledger that may help justify other 
decisions, creating countervailing incentives, that move the system closer to 
equilibrium.” Id. 
38 Id. at 245 (quoting Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for 
Governmental Cooperation with Faith Based Social Service Providers, 46 
EMORY L.J. 1, 27 (1997)) [hereinafter Esbeck, Constitutional Case]. Esbeck, 
Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General, participated in drafting the 
charitable choice legislation and advocated before Congress for its passage. 
See Brownstein, supra note 36, at 234; Carl H. Esbeck, Statement Before the 
United States House of Representatives Concerning Charitable Choice and 
Community Solutions Act, 16 J. NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 567, 
568 (2002) [hereinafter Esbeck, Concerning Charitable Choice]. Esbeck 
argues that government should minimize its impact on religious organizations 
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Neutrality theory implements this integration by 
“distinguishing between burdens and benefits.”39 Under its 
operational rules, minimization of government influence is 
achieved by: “(1) allowing religious providers equal access to 
[state] benefits, and (2) allowing them separate relief from 
regulatory burdens.”40 
In other words, Esbeck defines “neutrality” in this context as 
special dispensation from rules of otherwise general application—
as tilting the level playing field.41 As Professor Brownstein notes, 
however, “granting an exemption from a general law confers 
substantial material benefits” much as if a particular religious 
group were excused from payment of an onerous, but generally 
applicable, tax.42 Comparing such an approach to the neutrality 
theory underpinning free speech principles, Brownstein argues 
that by providing special regulatory exemptions for proponents of 
a religious point of view, but not for proponents of other, secular 
viewpoints, programs like charitable choice may distort the 
marketplace of ideas and run afoul of the First Amendment.43 
                                                          
when determining eligibility criterion for federal funding of social service 
programs. See Esbeck, Constitutional Case, supra at 24. 
39 Esbeck, Constitutional Case, supra note 38, at 24. According to 
Esbeck, religious organizations should be allowed equal access to benefits, but 
should be granted separate relief from regulatory burdens. Id. He suggests that 
this “best of both worlds” approach is precisely what the First Amendment 
was designed to encompass. Id. at 27. 
40 Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
41 Id. at 20-21. See also Brownstein, supra note 36, at 251 (critiquing 
Esbeck for ignoring that neutrality of government spending decisions is a 
sham). 
42 Brownstein, supra note 36, at 261. 
43 Id. at 271. Other commentators have made similar suggestions as to 
potential First Amendment concerns and infringements raised by charitable 
choice initiatives and legislation. See, e.g., Michelle Dibadj, The Legal and 
Social Consequences of Faith-Based Initiatives and Charitable Choice, 26 S. 
ILL. U. L.J. 529, 556 (2002) (arguing that Faith-Based Initiatives offer 
protection for religious organizations resulting in preferential treatment over 
non-religious organizations); Carmen M. Guerricagoitia, Innovation Does Not 
Cure Constitutional Violation: Charitable Choice and the Establishment 
Clause, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 447, 472-73 (2001) (stating that 
charitable choice violates any of the three principles of the Establishment 
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IV.  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND CHARITABLE CHOICE 
Disputes over the nature of fundamental fairness and genuine 
equality have figured prominently in political debate and 
litigation over affirmative action programs. One element of that 
debate centers upon the appropriate level of analysis; that is, to 
what extent should courts take note of the history of black 
Americans as a group, and to what extent should judicial 
remedies address discrimination against discrete, identifiable 
individuals?44 The American legal system is uncomfortable with 
the claims of so-called “identity politics.” Unlike the legal 
systems in countries described by Kymlicka, ours has historically 
focused on individual rights and responsibilities, and Americans 
are profoundly uncomfortable when individual merit and 
behavior are not the primary focus of legal analysis.45 For 
example, it has been noted that: 
[t]he official American vision of equality has been one of 
                                                          
Clause, secular purpose, coercion and endorsement, and is therefore 
unconstitutional). 
44 See generally Sandra Levitsky, Reasonably Accommodating Race: 
Lessons From the ADA For Targeted Affirmative Action, 18 LAW & INEQ. 85, 
111 (2000) (citing various views on affirmative action). Levitsky notes 
evidence that most Americans “do not approve of remedies to persistent 
inequality that grant rewards on the basis of group membership rather than 
individual merit” and that “[a] successful affirmative action measure will 
necessarily have to contain then, an individual based remedy.” Id. 
45 See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 57 (attributing a negative 
attitude toward international protection of national minorities to the League of 
Nation’s minority protection scheme, which facilitated the Nazi aggression in 
Czechoslovakia and Poland). Kymlicka notes that providing that separation of 
church and state as a resolution to the growing conflict between Catholics and 
Protestants in European countries in the sixteenth century resulted in an 
entrenchment of individual freedom of religion and oppression of religious 
minorities. Id. at 3. Additionally, he notes the uniqueness of Canadian 
federalism for its accommodation of both individual and “group-specific 
community rights.” Id. at 26-27. He also asserts that the instability of the 
former Soviet Union arising from disputes over boundaries, local autonomy, 
language, and naturalization could have been resolved by restoring the rights 
of minority groups, rather than relying solely on general human rights 
principles. Id. at 5. 
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a society in which group identity is legally irrelevant, 
where individual conduct is the only proper concern of 
government, and individual merit the only determinant of 
reward in the workplace. In such a system, individuals are 
rewarded or punished based upon their behavior and 
performance. Race, religion, sex, and similar markers of 
group affiliation are unrelated to one’s legal or 
employment status, despite how meaningful those 
affiliations may be to the individual. The civil rights 
movement spoke so powerfully to the nation’s conscience 
because the treatment of minorities was blatantly 
inconsistent with our stated commitment to equality and 
fundamental fairness.46 
Both the original 1964 Civil Rights Act and subsequent 
affirmative action programs begin by recognizing that injustices 
done to black Americans as a group have harmed individual 
members of that group in ways courts can neither quantify nor 
fully identify, and that individualized remedies are inadequate.47 
If institutionalized racism has distorted the operation of economic 
and educational systems and diminished access and opportunities 
available to most African-Americans, the simple cessation of 
discrimination, without more, would leave many without the 
means to fully enter into American life.48 To achieve genuine 
equality and overcome the burdens of past discrimination, 
affirmative action programs were based upon the belief that 
achievement of ultimate equality required government to “tilt” 
                                                          
46 Sheila S. Kennedy & Richard J. Magjucka, Reducing Identity Politics 
in the Workplace: A Modest Proposal, 17 MID. AM. J. BUS. 33 (2002). 
47 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (2000). See 
also Bernard Grofman, Civil Rights, the Constitution, Common Decency, and 
Common Sense, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 226 (Bernard 
Grofman ed., 2000) (noting that injustices done to black Americans are not 
easily quantifiable and cannot always be remedied with a lawsuit); Rachel F. 
Moran, Diversity Distance and the Delivery of Higher Education, in A 
READER ON RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN LAW 297 (Timothy Davis 
et. al. eds., 2001) (noting that affirmative action laws grew out of the inability 
of the courts to provide remedies on a case by case basis). 
48 Id. 
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the playing field.49 
The extent of the tilt—the degree to which racial identity 
should be a factor in employment or education decisions—has 
been the subject of considerable litigation.50 Judicial opinions 
have been closely divided. Indeed, as Ashutosh Bhagwat noted, 
three of the most significant affirmative action cases, Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke,51 Fullilove v. Klutznick52 
                                                          
49 Academics, practitioners and politicians have offered multiple and 
various arguments in favor of affirmative action programs. For a description 
and assessment of the principal traditional arguments in support of affirmative 
action, see generally Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: 
Confronting the Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 548, 556-67 
(2002) (explaining that affirmative action initiatives are necessary for such 
reasons as that otherwise all but a few black students would attend non-
selective colleges, the black-white gap in social conditions would increase, the 
economic status of black people would decrease and there would be socially 
disruptive reactions within black communities such as increases in crime). 
50 It should be noted here that a similar analysis could be made with 
respect to gender, although the application of affirmative action to gender-
based initiatives has been less contentious. For a discussion of this 
phenomena, see generally Daniel P. Tokaji & Mark D. Rosenbaum, 
Promoting Equality by Protecting Local Power: A Neo-Federalist Challenge to 
State Affirmative Action Bans, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 136-38 (1999) 
(explaining that state laws banning sex-conscious affirmative action directly 
conflict with the core constitutional principle of equal protection and showing 
how a proper determination may be made regarding what, if any, sex-
conscious affirmative action initiatives are necessary and appropriate). 
51 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (striking down the University of California’s 
affirmative action policies as requiring illegal racial quotas even though race 
may be used as a factor in admissions decisions). The university’s affirmative 
action policy included a separate admissions committee for economically 
and/or educationally disadvantaged applicants and applicants who were of a 
racial minority. Id. Such candidates were exempted from the general rule that 
applicants with a grade point average of less than 2.5 were summarily rejected 
admission. Id. 
52 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980) (upholding the “minority business 
enterprise” provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 because 
Congress had determined that extensive discrimination occurred within the 
construction industry and Congress was entitled to judicial deference). The 
provision required at least ten percent of federal funds granted for public work 
projects be used to procure services from business owned predominately by 
racial minorities. Id. 
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and Wygand v. Jackson Board of Education,53 were decided by 
pluralities; the Supreme Court could not even muster a majority 
opinion.54 
In Adarand Constructors v. Pena, the Rhenquist Court held 
that all race-conscious programs, state or federal, discriminatory 
or benign, are subject to strict scrutiny, thus clarifying an area of 
doctrinal uncertainty about when strict scrutiny was required.55 
As Bhagwat observes, however: 
                                                          
53 476 U.S. 267, 296 (1986) (holding a public teachers’ collective 
bargaining agreement invalid on the ground that there must be convincing 
evidence of prior discrimination before a public employer can use limited 
racial classifications to remedy that discrimination). The bargaining agreement 
protected minority teachers during layoffs and resulted in layoffs of white 
teachers who had more seniority than some retained black teachers. Id. 
54 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests: 
Equal Protection Jurisprudence at the Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
260, 262 (2002) (noting that the lack of a majority opinion in cases addressing 
the constitutionality of benign race-conscious governmental actions produced 
confusion regarding the circumstances under which governments were 
permitted to engage in race-conscious decision making and the applicable 
standard of constitutional review in to such cases). It should be noted here, 
however, that after declining to revisit the issue of affirmative action in the 
context of education for twenty-four years, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari for Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted, 123 S. Ct. 617, 154 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2002). The Sixth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision in favor of an unsuccessful law school 
applicant that the University of Michigan’s admissions procedure violated the 
Equal Protection Clause by giving preference to minority applicants. Id. at 
735. The Sixth Circuit found that the school had a compelling interest in 
achieving a diverse student body, and giving minority students a plus in the 
admissions process for the purposes of fostering diversity does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 739, 747. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari; the Court’s decision was pending at the time of publication. 
55 515 U.S. 200 (1995). In Adarand, a white subcontractor who was not 
awarded a portion of a federal highway project brought an action challenging 
the constitutionality of a federal program designed to provide highway 
contracts to disadvantaged business enterprises. Id. at 210. The subcontractor 
claimed that a benign racial classification, such as the one at issue, violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed 
summary judgment in favor of the government, but the Supreme Court 
remanded the case, finding that racial classifications should be examined under 
strict scrutiny. Id. at 227. 
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an examination of recent decisions by the federal courts of 
appeals reveals widespread disagreement and confusion 
regarding the constitutionality of race-conscious official 
action. Despite facial unanimity regarding the applicable 
standard of review, courts differ widely in how they 
implement the strict scrutiny standard. In particular, there 
is an explicit and widening division among the courts of 
appeals regarding the kinds of governmental objectives 
that are sufficiently ‘compelling’ to justify race-based 
actions that disfavor the majority race, a division the 
Supreme Court has studiously avoided resolving.56 
In Hopwood v. Texas, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit determined that diversity of the student body at a state 
university’s law school was not sufficiently compelling to justify 
an admissions policy that gave preferential treatment to African-
American and Hispanic applicants.57 The court held that, absent a 
history of discrimination by the school that would justify 
remedial measures, the program could not survive equal 
protection scrutiny.58  
                                                          
56 Bhagwat, supra note 54, at 263. 
57 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). In Hopwood, a class of non-minority 
applicants rejected by a state university law school challenged the law school’s 
affirmative action admissions program as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The school utilized a Texas Index (TI) 
number, a combination of undergraduate grade point average and Law School 
Aptitude Test score, as a basis for admission. Id. at 935. In addition, the 
school considered factors such as the strength of a student’s undergraduate 
education, the difficulty of his or her major, significant trends in the student’s 
grades and the qualities each applicant might bring to the law school class. Id. 
Applicants with a TI number that exceeded a certain threshold were 
presumptively admitted, while those below were denied. Id. at 935-36. The 
plaintiffs challenged the admission process, contending that the practice of 
having lower TI thresholds for black and Mexican applicants violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 938. The Fifth 
Circuit, finding for the plaintiff class, noted that “[t]he law school has 
presented no compelling justification, under the Fourteenth Amendment or 
Supreme Court precedent that allows it to continue to elevate some races over 
others, even for the wholesome purpose of correcting perceived racial 
imbalance in the student body.” Id. at 934. 
58 Id. at 952. Specifically, the court noted that benign racial classifications 
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Similarly, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia 
struck down Federal Communications Committee regulations 
intended to foster diversity in programming, declining to find any 
compelling government interest in promoting broadcast 
diversity.59 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit upheld 
preferential hiring of black officers to staff a boot camp in which 
the young offenders were predominantly African-American, 
accepting the state’s argument that the presence of black staff 
members was essential to the program’s success and thus a 
compelling state interest.60 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit upheld 
                                                          
must be strictly scrutinized, meaning that “the racial classification must serve 
a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that goal.” Id. at 
941. The school’s admission program did not serve a compelling state interest 
of remedying past discrimination because although Texas state actors had 
discriminated against minorities in the past, there was no evidence that the law 
school was an offending actor. Id. at 948-49. The court noted that “[b]ecause 
a state does not have a compelling state interest in remedying the present 
effects of past societal discrimination, however, we must examine the district 
court’s legal determination that the relevant governmental entity is the system 
of education within the state as a whole.” Id. at 949. 
59 See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 355 
(D.C. Cir. 1998). The Church challenged a FCC order finding that the 
Church failed to follow the equal employment opportunity guidelines for 
hiring minorities at the church’s radio station. Id. at 346. Though other 
positions in the Church did not require Lutheran training, the radio positions 
did, thus considerably narrowing the pool of minority applicants. Id. The 
Church challenged the FCC’s race-based employment program as a violation 
of equal protection provided by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 345. The Court 
found that the FCC did not define “diverse programming” and did not 
establish how race brings diversity in programming and therefore, the interest 
it intended to safeguard was too abstract and did not meet the equal 
protection’s compelling standard. Id. at 354-55. 
60 See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996). Three white 
correctional officers who were denied a lieutenant position over a less 
qualified black applicant challenged the hiring as a violation of equal 
protection. Id. at 917. The boot camp, comprised of seventy percent black 
youths but only six percent black correction officers, was designed to 
rehabilitate young criminals as an alternative to prison, and the program’s 
success depended on the inmates taking brutal orders from drill sergeants. Id. 
Using a strict scrutiny standard, the court found that expert evidence supported 
the state’s argument that the correctional program would not succeed unless 
there were blacks in positions of authority to get the black inmates to respond 
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an admissions process for an elementary-level university 
laboratory school that made race and ethnicity a part of the 
admissions decision, agreeing with the university that research 
goals required a representative student body.61 Thus, the interest 
in safeguarding those goals was sufficiently compelling for 
purposes of equal protection analysis.62 
There are numerous additional cases in which federal circuit 
and district courts have had to determine whether a given interest 
was sufficiently “compelling” to meet the constitutional standard 
under the facts of the case.63 Such determinations are necessarily 
                                                          
to the drills, therefore, the hiring of the black applicant was a compelling 
interest. Id. at 920. This decision did not intend that the employees mirror the 
composition of the inmates, just that there is some representation. Id. 
61 Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 
(9th Cir. 1999). The University Elementary School (UES) is a research 
laboratory that determines the needs of California’s change in population 
through its own experiences with a diverse student body. Id. at 1062. To 
achieve useful results, UES employed a specific admissions process aimed at 
producing a student population that reflected the population of urban public 
schools, including consideration of factors such as race/ethnicity, gender and 
family income. Id. The parents of a student applicant who was not admitted to 
the school based on the race/ethnicity criteria challenged the constitutionality 
of the admissions process under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, triggering the strict scrutiny standard requiring that the Regents 
show that race/ethnicity was a narrowly tailored means to serve a compelling 
state interest. Id. at 1063. The circuit court affirmed the district court’s 
holding that “the defendants’ interest in operating a research-oriented 
elementary school is compelling.” Id. at 1064. The court also found that the 
use of race/ethnicity in the admissions process was “narrowly tailored to 
achieve the necessary laboratory environment.” Id. at 1067. 
62 Id. at 1067. Specifically, the court noted that the California’s benefit 
from the school’s development of effective techniques for use in urban public 
schools was a compelling interest and the use of race/ethnicity in the school’s 
admissions process was narrowly tailored to developing those techniques. Id. 
The court stated that “California has a compelling interest in providing 
effective education to its diverse, multi-ethnic, public school population. . . . 
[The admissions process] produce[s] research results which can be used to 
improve the education of California’s ethnically diverse urban public school 
population.” Id. 
63 A catalogue of such cases and in-depth analysis of the jurisprudence 
surrounding “compelling interest” is beyond the scope of this article. For 
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ad hoc, and the resulting body of equal protection jurisprudence 
demonstrates—if demonstration were needed—the inherent 
difficulty of using technical legal formulae as a proxy for 
equality.64 
Affirmative action programs geared to racial and gender 
disparities are not the only administrative or legislative efforts 
intended to correct prior discrimination. In 1996, Section 104 of 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, popularly 
dubbed charitable choice, addressed a perceived government bias 
against contracting with religious social service providers.65 
                                                          
thorough review and thoughtful commentary, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose 
Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 300 (1997). 
Bhagwat notes that in Adarand Constructors v. Pena the Supreme Court held 
that any discrimination predicated upon race, including that adopted under 
affirmative action, is to be analyzed under strict scrutiny and therefore 
obligates the government to present a compelling justification underlying such 
practice. Id. He also acknowledges that in Hopwood v. Texas the Court ruled 
that a law school admissions policy favoring minority applicants for admission 
was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because promoting 
student diversification “could never qualify as a ‘compelling’ government 
interest.” Id. See also Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental 
Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term In Constitutional Adjudication, 
68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 919 (1988) (discussing that the notion of “compelling 
interest lacks a strong textual foundation in the Constitution,” which never 
explicitly mandates or defines the term; rather “some governmental interests 
can be justified on the basis of penumbras surrounding Constitutional rights” 
while others may be rationalized as “among the purposes for which particular 
governmental powers were authorized.”). 
64 See Bhagwat, supra note 63, at 308-09 (noting that “[l]egislatures, not 
courts, have the best institutional ability to identify and assess the efficacy of 
means. When courts do second-guess legislative choices of this nature, they 
tend to be either proceeding ad hoc or disguising their true concerns.”); 
Gottlieb, supra note 63, at 937. Gottlieb notes that “the Court’s treatment of 
governmental interests has become largely intuitive, a kind of ‘know it as I see 
it’ approach. . . In turn, this kind of ad hoc approach is suspect as 
inconsistent, unprincipled, and lacking the impartiality we require from the 
Court.” Id. 
65 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A)-(B). This section provides “[a] State may 
administer and provide services . . . through contracts with charitable, 
religious, or private organizations; and provide beneficiaries of assistance 
under the programs . . . with certificates, vouchers, or other forms of 
disbursement which are redeemable with such organizations.” Id. 
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Proponents of greater involvement in the complex network of 
governmental social support by grass roots religious providers 
argued that Section 104 was necessary to “level the playing 
field,” although religious providers like Catholic Charities, 
Lutheran Social Services, Jewish Family & Children’s Services 
and the Salvation Army had long histories of partnering with 
government.66 Supporters of the legislation argued that confusion 
over the application of First Amendment’s Establishment Clause 
doctrine caused government officials to disfavor religious bidders 
in some cases and impose burdensome requirements on those 
with whom they did business in other cases.67 Advocates of 
greater “faith-based” participation in welfare programs 
encouraged states to reach out to such organizations and 
encourage their participation.68 Some states, like Massachusetts, 
took the position that their playing field was already level and did 
                                                          
66 See Sheila Kennedy & Wolfgang Bielefeld, Government Shekels 
Without Government Shackles? The Administrative Challenges of Charitable 
Choice, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 4 (2002). 
67 See, e.g., John J. Diulio Jr., The New Civil Rights Struggle, WALL ST. 
J., June 20, 2002, at A16. Diulio, a professor at University of Pennsylvania, 
Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute and former director of the White 
House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, noted that 
“[o]pponents of President Bush’s Faith-Based Initiative [have] rushed to claim 
that government funding of faith-based organizations providing social welfare 
services violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment.” Id. He 
further argued, “in their purported fidelity to Constitutional values, they have 
overlooked the implication of an equally important amendment, the 14th.” Id. 
See also Lewis D. Solomon & Matthew J. Vlissides, Jr., Faith-Based 
Charities and the Quest to Solve America’s Social Ills: A Legal and Policy 
Analysis, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 265, 267 (2001) (stating that some 
faith-based advocates believe there should be legislation to level the playing 
field between religious and secular charitable organizations because as the law 
stands now religious programs are not treated equally). 
68 See Amy L. Sherman, A Report on Charitable Choice Implementation 
in 15 States, (Hudson Institute/Faith in Communities, Charlottesville, VA), 
2002, available at http://www.hudsonfaithincommunities.org/articles/Final 
ExecSummBroch.pdf. See also Esbeck, Constitutional Case, supra note 38, at 
26; Solomon & Vlissides, Faith-Based Charities and the Quest, supra note 67, 
at 267. 
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little to specifically implement charitable choice.69 Others, like 
Indiana, instituted extensive, and relatively expensive, programs 
designed to acquaint small religious providers with opportunities 
for government collaborations.70 These efforts to include faith-
based organizations (FBOs) have raised many of the same 
questions as traditional affirmative action programs. 
Perhaps the thorniest of these issues involves application of 
bid qualifications: shall the same criteria be applied to FBOs as 
are applied to secular providers? In an article published in 
Commentary, Leslie Lenkowsky argued for “elimination of 
arbitrary rules that allow, for example, the use of professional 
therapy but not pastoral counseling.”71 As with affirmative 
action, equal treatment is in the eye of the beholder: if the state 
insists that a responsive bidder employ licensed social workers or 
credentialed drug therapists, does that requirement discriminate 
against FBOs whose programs use pastors rather than social 
workers or trained counselors? On the other hand, if the state 
relaxes certification requirements for FBOs, does this amount to 
an unconstitutional preference for religious providers? What is 
the difference between “equal treatment” and “special rights”?72 
                                                          
69 See Solomon & Vlissides, Faith-Based Charities and the Quest, supra 
note 67, at 281, citing THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, CHARITABLE 
CHOICE COMPLIANCE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD (Oct. 5, 2000) (reporting 
that in addition to Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, Mississippi, and 
Vermont claim that charitable choice is an option they can ignore), available 
at http://downloads.weblogger.com/gems/cpj/50StateRpt.pdf. 
70 See Laureen Fagan, Indiana Leads in Faith-based Initiatives, S. BEND 
TRIB., June 27, 2002. 
71 Leslie Lenkowsky, Funding the Faithful: Why Bush is Right, 111 
COMMENT. 19, 23 (2001) (rebutting the various arguments that have been 
advanced in opposition to President Bush’s plans for government support of 
faith-based organizations and offering solutions to alleviate some of the 
concerns raised). 
72 In testimony before Senate Committee on the Judiciary, John L. Avery 
of the National Association of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors 
(NAADAC) focused upon precisely this issue, saying that “NAADAC’s 
concern is not with who provides care, but rather by what clinical standards 
that care is provided.” Faith Based Solutions: What are the Legal Issues?: 
Hearing on S.304 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 
(2001) (statement of John L. Avery, Director of Government Relations, 
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Similarly, provisions of Section 104 that allow FBOs to 
discriminate on the basis of religion in employment have been 
widely attacked, by secular and religious organizations alike, as 
special accommodation unwarranted by public policy.73 
Defenders of the provisions respond that a failure to recognize 
and accommodate the religious nature of FBOs would amount to 
a special burden on faith and would be discriminatory.74 
Lost in the arguments about fair play and equal treatment are 
cautionary notes sounded by social science researchers who warn 
that competition between groups is more polarizing than 
competition between individuals: 
[t]aking more for one’s group seems to be more legitimate 
than taking more for oneself, even though one benefits in 
both cases. Implicit in the act of allocating to one’s group 
                                                          
NAADAC), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/te060601jla.htm. 
As I have written elsewhere, “[i]f FBOs believe insistence on evidence of 
“clinical competency” is discriminatory, and NAADAC believes that failure to 
require such evidence is malpractice, it is no wonder that many public 
administrators feel caught in an untenable situation.” Kennedy & Bielefeld, 
supra note 66, at 7. 
73 Both secular and non-secular groups oppose charitable choice because 
of fear of discrimination in hiring and provision of services. For example, The 
Interfaith Alliance has taken a position against charitable choice legislation, in 
part because of the potential for “discrimination toward members of minority 
faiths and ethnic traditions who are in need of assistance” and “the potential 
for employment discrimination against non-believers or members of religions 
differing from that of the provider.” Position of the Interfaith Alliance on 
Charitable Choice Legislation, The Interfaith Alliance, available at www.inter 
faithalliance.org/Initiatives/ccpos.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2003). The 
American Civil Liberties Union has also issued statements against faith-based 
initiatives. See Latest Government Funding of Controversial Religious 
Programs One More Reason Not to Pass Faith-Based Plan Without 
Protections, American Civil Liberties Union, Oct. 9, 2002, (noting that “[t]he 
Bush Administration seems determined to ignore Congress and continues to 
argue that faith-based organizations should have the right to discriminate in 
hiring against people based on their religion in publicly funded programs.”), 
available at www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=10854&c=37. 
74 See Paul Taylor, The Costs of Denying Religious Organizations The 
Right to Staff On a Religious Basis When They Join Federal Social Service 
Efforts, 12 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 159, 169-74 (2002) (defending 
discrimination on the basis of religion in hiring practices). 
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is the justification that other people will benefit: there 
exists the possibility that taking more for one’s group may 
reflect the individual’s genuine concern with the welfare 
of fellow group members and not just greedy 
behavior. . .The problem arises when one’s opponent in 
the negotiation is also representing his/her group.75 
Whatever one’s position on the merits of particular 
affirmative action programs or versions of charitable choice, the 
controversy each has aroused is indisputable.76 No matter what 
rules the courts ultimately impose, some will feel betrayed—and 
unequal. Further restrict or eliminate affirmative action, and 
those who have borne the brunt of America’s racist history will 
say that they do not have equal access to the playing field. 
Confirm those same programs and others will complain that 
special efforts to redress past injuries that benefit an entire group 
are too broad and inherently unequal. Tell religious organizations 
that they must meet the same standards as secular service 
providers, and they will argue that such a position fails to take 
into account their essential nature and is discriminatory. Make 
special rules for such organizations and their secular competitors 
will protest that the playing field has been unfairly tilted. Where 
you stand, as the saying goes, depends upon where you sit. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
What are the implications for government legitimacy and the 
                                                          
75 Kristina A. Diekmann, Ann E. Tenbrunsel & Max H. Bazerman, 
Fairness, Justification, and Dispute Resolution, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 196 (Sandra E. Gleason 
ed., 1997) (arguing that although fairness constrains decision-making and 
negotiation, a person will nevertheless maximize his or her personal outcome 
if it can be justified and that the presence of a group may make the self-
serving motivation less obvious, allowing for even more self-interested 
behavior). 
76 Regardless of one’s personal opinion on the relative strengths or ills of 
affirmative action and charitable choice initiatives, the one assertion upon 
which all groups can agree is that all groups do not agree. See generally supra 
notes 43, 49, 72, 73 (setting forth various argument both for and against the 
programs). 
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rule of law if significant constituencies experience government 
programs as biased or unfair? A few come to mind. First, 
democratic deliberation becomes problematic. We have already 
seen how proponents and opponents of affirmative action and 
charitable choice “talk past each other.” In a very real sense, 
they are inhabitants of different realities. But democracies require 
common ground to function, and some agreement on the nature 
of equality would seem to be a precondition for finding that 
common ground. Second, compromise becomes difficult, if not 
impossible. If different people see different realities, how can we 
formulate policies that all will consider to be fair and equal? 
Third, social stability is jeopardized. If government is to be seen 
as legitimate, it must live up to its own principles. In America, 
equality is a—perhaps the—foundational precept. When a 
significant segment of our society believes that it is being 
marginalized, devalued or treated in a discriminatory manner, or 
that others are being unfairly privileged, there is a real potential 
for social upheaval. 
What, if anything, can public administrators—those on the 
front lines—do to foster public perceptions of fair play by the 
state? While it falls to policymakers to fashion laws that attempt 
to bridge very different perceptions of equal treatment, 
administrators are not without tools of their own. At a minimum, 
those charged with administering the laws must take care to do so 
in as evenhanded a fashion as possible. Where rules prescribe 
different treatment for members of different groups, 
administrators must clarify that they are acting pursuant to the 
law, and not on the basis of personal bias. Whenever possible, 
they should explain the purpose of laws that may be perceived as 
favoring some groups over others. 
These actions, of course, are all aspects of the 
professionalism that we expect from public administrators.77 But 
                                                          
77 See generally Anthony M. Bertelli & Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., A Precept 
of Managerial Responsibility: Securing Collective Justice In Institutional 
Reform Litigation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 317 (2001). The authors note that 
“[professionalism] allows a cadre of professionals—public administrators of 
human service agencies—to interpret the laws that govern them, and to work 
towards collective justice—providing adequate services to most beneficiaries at 
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administrators can and should do more: they should give 
policymakers the benefit of their street level experiences. If 
programs are not working, no matter how well intentioned, they 
need to be modified. If misconceptions are rampant, those must 
be addressed through public education. Most importantly, public 
administrators need to remind citizens and policymakers alike of 
the importance of maintaining the principle of government 
neutrality toward those who are similarly situated. It is one thing 
to engage in outreach to identify those who may be wary of 
working with government or build to help potential bidders meet 
a legitimate professional standard. It is quite another to relax the 
standard. The first path adds substance to public resources, the 
second sows distrust and discord. 
CONCLUSION 
Eventually, if America manages to eradicate the vestiges of 
slavery and segregation, the nation may no longer need 
affirmative action. Even ardent proponents of charitable choice 
have suggested that replacing direct contracts with vouchers 
allowing program recipients to choose their own social service 
provider might ease both the First Amendment and fairness 
issues, although such policies raise substantial concerns about the 
marketization of public goods. But the need to define the nature 
of equality and equal treatment, to sketch the landscape of truly 
level playing field and provide clear guideposts for the public 
officials who must administer government programs, will 
remain—a daunting but absolutely essential task of liberal 
democracy. 
 
                                                          
the expense of the constitutional rights of a few.” Id. at 332. 
